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COMMENTS
IV
Obviously the Roman law did not cover all the ramifications which a modern
conservation program might entail. However, it did try to apply to the erosion
problem, as then known, the basic legal principles governing the every-day
conduct of its citizens. In this respect, we might well learn from it. The
"damage to an adjoining farm from uncontrolled gullies" described as such
a problem in the above-quoted report of the Chief of the Soil Conservation
Service is exactly the case covered by the actio aquae pluvide arcendac. Simi-
larly, the interdictum quod vi aut clam offers a private approach to a conserva-
tion problem for which the United States Forest Service proposes as the only
solution public regulation.
Is it not justified to ask why we should be stumped by situations for which
effective remedies were developed nineteen hundred years ago and that from
a law that was virtually like ours on the subject of negligence, trespass and
nuisances. In fact, the principles used by the Romans have governed the
law of adjoining land owners since the dawn of history. Already the Codex
Hammurabi (2000 B. C.) provided that a farmer who failed to use proper
care in building his dykes or letting in irrigation water was liable to surround-
ig property owners for any damage by flooding.2 0
The defense against soil erosion, not only in a situation like gullying but
in most other instances of man-made erosion like the plowing of dust bowls
and the destruction of watershed protection could be materially aided by a
simple assertion of the same principles as embodied in the common law and
used in cases like Rylands v. Fletcher,27 Miles v. A. Arena & Co s and Miller
v. Letzerict:7' Such assertion in a civil action would hold the despoilers of
our soil resources accountable as common tortfeasors for damage done to their
neighbor's property. In addition, it would by-pass the controversy about
government regulation and thereby deprive the offenders of the opportunity
of publicly masquerading as the champions of free enterprise.
CARRY-OVER EFFECT OF EXPRESS WARRAN'IES
ON SUBSEQUENT SALES
Commercial transactions over the past half century have undergone a pro-
found transition. In an era marked by the unparalleled growth of industry
and urban development, it was inevitable that the laws governing man's
dealing with new-born industry and his fellow man must bend under increasing
pressures. Previously the seller and buyer of goods stood in the same position;
each was felt to have equal knowledge of the goods as to quality and identity.
25. See note 1 supra.
26. HTAI sxuaB3, XV, 7-45 (Harper's transl 1904).
27. L. R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (only partially adopted in this country).
28. 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P. 2d 1260 (1937).
29. 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. 2d 404 (1932).
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The seller consequently owed the buyer no duty other than to deal in good
faith and not knowingly misrepresent the quality of the goods.' With the
advent of modern means of transportation, communication and credit and
security transactions, the buyer, whether wholesaler or retailer, more frequently
than not entered into contracts of sale without seeing the goods. Greater
reliance on the seller's good faith and integrity was a necessary consequence
of the above-mentioned transition. To keep abreast of the times the courts
shifted the burden from the buyer to the seller; caveat vendor became the
rule of law.2 The Uniform Sales Act was the outcome of this change in the
law when it established the warranties, both express and implied, 8 which
are incident to a sale of goods.
Much has been written on the law of express warranties and its concomitant
circumstances.4 However, there seems to have been little consideration of how
far these express warranties carry beyond the original transaction. The ma-
terial forming the substance of this paper addresses itself to the question-
does an express warranty given on a sale of goods carry over to subsequent
sales of identical goods between the same parties? As is the case in a great
portion of the law of sales, the intention of the parties as gleaned from their
dealings is of considerable moment. Factual as this question may ultimately
be, certain patterns have been followed by the courts in determining intention.
Three situations will be discussed in this connection-i) trial orders and tests
by the buyer; 2) reference in subsequent orders to previous orders to which
express warranties attached; 3) an anticipated future course of dealings be-
tween the parties.
I. TRIAL ORDERS AND TESTS BY BUYER
An express warranty has been defined as "any affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the goods . . . if the natural tendency of such
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if
the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." 5 Reliance on the seller's
affirmations of fact or promises has been considered an essential element of
1. Otis & Co. v. Grimes, 97 Colo. 219, 48 P. 2d 788 (1935); Davis v. Central Land
Co., 162 Iowa 269, 143 N. W. 1073 (1913); Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 47 N. E.
923 (1897). See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L.
REv. 733 (1929).
2. UNIFORMe SALES ACT § 12. Landman v. Bloomer, 117 Ala. 312, 23 So. 75 (1898);
Hacket v. Lewis, 36 Cal. App. 687, 173 Pac. 111 (1918); Dietrich v. Badders, 90 Atl.
47 (Del. Super. Ct. 1913). See also VOLD, SALEs § 142 (1931).
3. UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 12-16 (N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 93-97).
4. See Williston, What Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law of Sales, 21 HARv.
L. REv. 555 (1908); Bogert, Express Warranties in Sales of Goods, 33 YALE L. J. 14
(1923) ; Sholley, Manufacturer's Advertisement as Express Warranty to Consumer, 7
WASH. L. REv. 351 (1932).
5. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12 (N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 93).
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any express warranty.6 And this reliance by the buyer must be reasonable
and justifiable under all the circumstances
When the buyer purchases a small quantity of a seller's product and makes
it known that the purchase is merely a trial order to test the product, the
normal inference to be drawn from such a purchase is that the buyer will only
make subsequent purchases if the goods conform to his needs.8 Reliance is
not placed on the seller's warranties other than for the original purchase.0
In effect, the buyer is saying--"On the basis of your express warranties,
Mr. Seller, I will make a single purchase of your product. I will then test your
product. If, after testing, I am satisfied that the product will serve my needs,
I shall continue to use it. But the tests will be the determining factor-not the
warranties." Where no other sufficient evidence is produced to override the
inference of non-reliance by virtue of the trial order,' 0 the courts have little
difficulty in concluding that the express warranty was intended only to apply
to the first sale. The original sale was a single completed transaction and
once consummated, what was said and done then is ended with that trans-
action. 1
In Sure Seal Co. v. Loeber12 the plaintiff's salesman sold air-tight caps to
the defendant to protect his bottled preserves. Seller gave warranties; but
the purchase was on trial only. Subsequently the defendant ordered 300,000
more caps which were defective and caused the defendant's preserves to spoil.
The buyer's counterclaim founded on breach of express warranty was denied,
the court declaring:
"It is quite clear that this construction is unsupported by the evidence. . . . [be-
cause] defendant Charles C. Loeber repeatedly and explicitly testifies that the
order, given in February was a trial order, and that he would rather be shown
the excellence of the caps than take the salesman's word for it. . . . Defendants,
6. Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Consolidated Iron & Steel Mfg. Co., 23 F. 2d 416, 419 (2d Cir.
1928) ; Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 430 (1919); Redfield v. Engel, 171 Mich.
207, 137 N. W. 60 (1912); Ellen v. Heacock, 247 App. Div. 476, 286 N. Y. Supp. 740
(4th Dep't 1936); Smith v. Alphin, 150 N. C. 425, 64 S. E. 210 (1909).
7. Bogert, .Express Warranties in Sales of Goods, 33 Ymx. L. J. 14, 27 (1923).
8. In such cases there would not be even an implied warranty of fitness since the seller
does not contract to furnish goods for a specified object or purpose. Linen Thread Co.
v. Shaw, 9 F. 2d 17 (1st Cir. 1925); Robinson v. Barteldes Seed Co., 139 Md. 486, 11S
Ati. 757 (1921); TurI's Sons, Inc. v. Williams, 136 App. Div. 710, 121 N. Y. Supp. 478
(2d Dep't 1910).
9. Nicholson v. Am. Hide & Leather Co., 307 Mass. 456, 30 N. E. 2d 376 (1940);
Sure Seal Co. v. Loeber, 171 App. Div. 225, 227, 157 N. Y. Supp. 327, 328 (1st Dep't
1916); Crocker-Wheeler Electric Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co., 29 App. Div. 30, 301, 51 N. Y.
Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1898), aff'd tithout opinion, 164 N. Y. 593, 58 N. E. 1086 (1900);
Wait v. Borne, 123 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. 1053 (1890); see Childs et al. v. O'Donnell, 84
Mich. 533, 535, 47 N. W. 1108, 1109 (1891).
10. Moore v. King, 57 Hun 224, 10 N. Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1890).
11. Wait v. Borne, 123 N. Y. 592, 602, 25 N. E. 1053, 1054 (1890).
12. 171 App. Div. 225, 157 N. Y. Supp. 327 (Ist Dep't 1916).
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therefore, signally failed in the attempt to show that they were induced to buy the
300,000 caps by actual misrepresentation or express warranty."' 3
These purchases on a trial basis must be distinguished from analogous situ-
ations wherein the transaction has all the earmarks of a completed sale on a
trial basis but in reality there was only a sale on condition subsequent or no
sale at all. Thus, where the buyer is given a thirty day trial period in which
to test a machine before purchasing it14 or some other form of option to
return the product if it doesn't perform as guaranteed,", there is no express
warranty. The trial periods, options or guarantees are not warranties "but
special and additional contracts made at the same time as the sales contract.
They do not relate to the character, quality or title of the goods, but to some
act which the seller agrees to perform in respect to the goods."'" Consequently
any subsequent dealings between the parties in this type of transaction could
not result in the establishment of an express warranty in reliance on previous
conversations.
II. SUBSEQUENT ORDERS MADE WITi REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS ORDERS
ON WHICH WARRANTIES WERE GIVEN
Another situation frequently occurs where the issue is raised as to the
carry-over effect of express warranties. In this type of case the buyer makes
an original purchase relying on the express warranties of the seller. Sub-
sequently more orders are placed with the seller for the same product and in
each order specific reference is made to the original purchase to which the
express warranties had attached. To illustrate the problem in its simplest
form the buyer's order might read: "100 barrels of glu-bond of the same kind
and quality as you furnished on 10/10/49."
The courts have held that such reference to the previous sale disclosed an
intention to have the same warranties attach in the subsequent transactions
as existed on the initial purchase.17 Thus in Zabriskie v. Central Valley R.R.' 8
the plaintiff agreed to furnish coal of the same quality and kind as furnished
13. Id. at 227, 157 N. Y. Supp. at 328.
14. Birch v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 34 App. Div. 614, 54 N. Y. Supp. 449 (3d
Dep't 1898), aff'd, 165 N. Y. 617, 59 N. E. 1119 (1900); Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins,
79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381 (1914).
15. Warren v. Rinault Freres Selling Branch, 195 ]l. App. 117 (1915); Childs et al.
v. O'Donnell, 84 Mich. 533, 47 N. W. 1108 (1891); Elliot Supply Co. v. Hanson, 39 S. D.
570, 165 N. W. 991 (1917).
16. Bogert, Express Warranties in Sales of Goods, 33 YALE L. J. 14, 24 (1923).
17. Dewitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 306 (1890); Zabriskie v. Central Valley R. R., 131
N. Y. 72, 29 N. E. 1006 (1892); Moore v. King, 57 Hun 224, 10 N. Y. Supp. 651 (4th
Dep't 1890), aff'd, 134 N. Y. 596, 31 N. E. 624 (1892); Merit Machine Mfg. Co, v.
DeVinne-Hallenbeck Co., 227 App. Div. 296, 237 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1st Dep't 1929); Levy
v. Am. Wax & Paper Mfg. Co., 24 Misc. 204, 52 N. Y. Supp. 637 (App. Term 1898);
Stranahan Bros. Catering Co. v. Coit, 55 Ohio St. 398, 45 N. E. 634 (1896). Contra:
Camac v. Warriner, 1 C. B. 356, 135 Eng. Rep. 577 (1845).
18. 131 N. .Y. 72, 29 N. E. 1006 (1892).
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during the past year. The court held that in failing to supply coal of "a
particular quality and kind, determinable by a standard which was equally
well known and understood",19 plaintiff breached the warranties which he had
made the previous year and said warranties survived acceptance of the goods.
It would seem that the same result should obtain where an oral reference is
made to previous sales between the parties.20
The argument is made occasionally that the warranty of a previous sale
can not attach to subsequent sales even when the buyer refers expressly to
the previous sale and places reliance on the warranties previously given.
The reason for this position is grounded on basic contract considerations-
namely, to be bound the seller must intend that warranties have effect beyond
the original sale and unless he agrees to respond in damages, if his statement
proves untrue, he is not bound. If the seller does not evince an intention to
have the warranties carry over, he has not made an offer to respond in
damages which can be accepted by the buyer. This position has its origin
in the common law2 ' and probably is not in comformity with the best thinking
of modem authorities. But it does represent the law of Pennsylvania.- Today
it is not what the seller himself intended; but rather what the buyer is
reasonably allowed to conclude from the conduct of the parties and the nature
of the transaction. Mere lack of intention to warrant is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to negative a warranty.2 The seller's intent is not germane other
than to show he intended to assert a fact on which the buyer might reasonably
rely in making future transactions. An illustration of the far reaching effect
resulting from the court's disregard of the seller's actual intention is pointed
out in Merit Machine Mfg. Co. v. The DeVinne-Hallenbeck CoY4 The seller
had submitted a sample to induce an order from the buyer.s Subsequent
19. Id. at 77, 29 N. E. at 1007 (1892).
20. Greer v. Whalen, 125 Md. 273, 93 AUt. 521 (1915); Wait v. Borne, 123 N. Y. 592,
25 N. E. 1053 (1890).
21. Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 15 C. B. 130, 139 Eng. Rep. 369 (1854); Sauerman v.
Simmons, 74 Ark. 563, 86 S. W. 429 (1905); Coats v. Hord, 29 Cal. App. 115, 154 Pac.
491 (1915); Denver Suburban Homes & Water Co. v. Fugate, 63 Colo. 423, 163 Pac. 33
(1917); Turner Bros. v. Clark, 143 Ga. 44, 84 S. E. 116 (1915); Coleman v. Simpson,
162 App. Div. 335, 147 N. Y. Supp. 865 (2d Dep't 1914); 1 Williston, Sales §§ 19S-2C0
(Rev. ed. 1948).
22. Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 145 AUt. 67 (1929); Walker v. Kirk, 72
Pa. Super. Ct. 534 (1919).
23. 1 WELaxsTox, SA.LEs § 210 (Rev. ed. 1948); VoLw, SALES § 140 (1931). See also
Burns v. Limerick, 178 Mo. App. 145, 165 S. W. 1166 (1914); Fairbank Canning Co. v.
Metzger, 118 N. Y. 260, 23 N. E. 372 (1890); Hawkins v. Pemberton, S1 N. Y. 198
(1872).
24. 227 App. Div. 296, 237 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1st Dep't 1929).
25. Although the Uniform Sales Act (Section 16) refers to implied warranties in sales
by sample, most authorities have dassified a sale by sample as an express varranty.
1 WimusToN, SALES § 249 (Rev. ed. 1948); VowD, SA.Es § 145 (1931). See also Ellis v.
Rosalasky, 189 N. Y. Supp. 14 (App. Term 1921). Such a construction has this effet--
the sample is considered in the nature of an affirmation of fact and all goods sub-
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orders were also placed with the seller, express reference being made to the
initial order. Some of the goods did not conform to the previous orders since
they did not contain alkali-proof ink which was necessary for buyer's use and
which was present in the submitted sample. The seller's defense to a charge
of breach of express warranty was that he didn't know alkali-proof ink was
necessary. The court held that the buyer was entitled to his contract which
was to have the goods conform to the sample. Even though the seller had no
actual knowledge of the need for alkali-proof ink in the buyer's merchandise,
he must deliver goods which conform to the sample in every respect. Failure
so to comply constituted breach of an express warranty.
In Moore v. King26 the plaintiff-buyer purchased a sample of the defendant's
shellac in reliance on certain express warranties. Plaintiff later ordered a
barrel of the shellac "same as you sent us October 4, 1885", reference being
to the sample cask delivered on that date. A further order was made in which
reference was made to the second order (the one quoted above). The goods
supplied under the last order were defective and suit was commenced for
breach of the express warranties given with the sample. 27 The seller disclaimed
any warranty on the ground that at the time of the third sale no representations
were made and what was said at the first sale (the sample sale) had no binding
force or application thereafter. The court held for plaintiff and found the
evidence sufficient to show that the seller's agent warranted all goods would
be the same as the sample order and also that the reference in subsequent
orders to the first sale, even though that was by sample and as a test,
extended the express warranties to the subsequent sales.
The decision in the Moore case is significant from two aspects. First, it
gives support to the proposition that the buyer may recover on express
warranties of previous sales where he makes reference to said previous sales
in subsequent orders and also relies on the warranties previously given.
Second, it tends to place a limitation on what has been previously said re-
specting sales on a trial basis. For if the court can fairly infer from the
language of the buyer and seller that they "contemplated future orders, and
that whatever was said as to the quality and adaptability of the goods was
intended and understood to apply to subsequent sales", 28 the express warranties
will carry over despite the fact that the original order was a trial order. In Wait
v. Borne29 the facts were almost identical with those of the Moore case. Yet in
construing the language of the seller's agent the court felt no inference could be
drawn that the warranty was to apply to all other orders which the buyer
might decide to place in the future. The decisions in these cases forcibly
sequently bought in reliance on the sample must conform to the sample in every necessary
detail or an action will lie for breach of an express warranty.
26. 57 Hun 224, 10 N. Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1890), aff'd, 134 N. Y. 596, 31 N. E.
624 (1892).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. 57 Hun 224, 226, 10 N. Y. Supp. 651, 653 (4th Dep't 1890), aft'd, 134 N. Y. 596,
31 N. E. 624 (1892).
29. 123 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. 1053 (1890).
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demonstrate that the actual holding in each case will turn largely upon what
the court construes the intention of the parties to be. Each case must be
considered in some measure on its own facts.
III. ExPREss WARRANTIES RELIED ON PURPORTING TO COVER
A SERIES OF TRNSACnONS
The court in the Moore case indicated a possible third situation where con-
sideration of the carry-over effect of express warranties would be relevant.
If evidence is adduced to show that the parties contemplated a series of trans-
actions or a future course of dealings, it is conceivable that the e.xpress war-
ranties have application and effect beyond the original transaction. Although
the factors to be considered in determining this intent are analogous to those
considered in Section II, separate treatment of the problem is suggested in
aid of sharper delineation. Professor Williston has stated the problem in these
words:
"A more troublesome question arises where statements amounting to an express
warranty induce a sale of goods at a shop, and the customer, relying in fact on
the earlier statements, makes further purchases of the same kind of goods at the
same shop. The Massachusetts Court held that a warranty does not cover the
later sales, unless at least the statements relied upon purported to cover a series
of transactions."3 0
It would seem that Professor Williston is actually distinguishing two groups
of cases-) where the seller has reason to expect future orders and intends
himself or reasonably leads the buyer to assume that the former will be bound
in the future; and 2) where the seller should not be held liable on future sales
because he could not have anticipated that the buyer would make further pur-
chases from him or because the buyer was unreasonable and unwarranted in re-
lying in future dealings on previous transactions. This first group concerns itself
most frequently with the manufacturer-retailer relationship or the wholesaler-
retailer relationship. Although the courts have preferred to decide these cases
on their own individual facts (thus making it difficult to set down any rule
of uniform application), certain criteria may be established from an analysis
of the cases and used as a guide.
In the normal course of commercial transactions, when a manufacturer or
wholesaler of a standard product endeavors to induce a retailer to handle his
product, he is seeking more than a single isolated transaction. He is looking
for a future course of dealings between the two parties, the result of which
will be that the buyer will be a steady customer, a continuing outlet for the
seller's product. In such a situation it would not be overreaching for the
courts to conclude that the seller intended or the buyer was justified in con-
cluding that the warranties, given to induce the initial handling of the product,
should carry over to all subsequent transactions. And this is exactly what the
30. 1 Nms o , SALES § 210 (Rev. ed. 1948). The Mamchusetts case to which
reference is made is Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N. E. 631 (1934).
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courts have done. 31 In Stranahan Bros. Catering Co. v. Coit3 2 the plaintiff
manufactured cheese and required large quantities of milk. The defendant
promised and agreed at the time he first sold milk to the plaintiff that he
would deliver nothing but first-class milk of superior quality. Subsequent
deliveries were shown to have been watered and the court in allowing plaintiff
a recovery declared that "the liability of Coit was as broad under a breach
of this contract as though there had been an express warranty by him of
every lot of milk as it was delivered."133
Resolution of the question of intention in these cases is not as simple as
might be suspected from the findings in the Stranakan case. In Empire State
Bag Co. v. McDermott34 the buyer offered to return six bales of burlap be-
cause he alleged it was inferior in quality to that previously furnished. There
was no evidence of any intention that previous warranties would attach to
subsequent purchases. In fact there was a direct conflict in the evidence as
to whether the seller's employee had promised to supply goods of the same
quality as on previous occasions. The court, however, observed: ". . . and it
would perhaps be a fair deduction that nothing was said on the subject at
the time of the making of the contract; but defendants had a right to expect
a grade of material, under this agreement, as high as the plaintiff had pre-
viously furnished them. . .. -35 The ruling in this case, it has been said,30
necessarily carries over into the later purchases terms of the earlier bargains.
Certainly it could not be said that the seller in the Empire State Bag Co. case
intended his promises to carry over; yet the buyer was allowed to rely on these
promises as incidents of all future dealings.
That the same result would be reached in all instances where a manufacturer-
retailer relationship exists is very doubtful. For it must be remembered that
the continuance of the express warranty on subsequent sales, other than the
type of case discussed in Section II supra, is the exception rather than the
rule. This conclusion would seem to be corroborated by the quotation from
Professor Williston at the beginning of this Section. Thus, unless the court
can infer from the facts that a series of future transactions were contemplated
by the parties and the warranties were intended reasonably to refer to sub-
sequent sales, no express warranties will carry over from the first transaction."1
31. Free et al. v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (1948) ; Am. Fruit Product
Co. v. Davenport Vinegar & Pickling Works, 172 Iowa 683, 154 N. W. 1031 (1915);
Leavitt v. Fiberoid Co., 196 Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682 (1907) ; Moore v. King, 57 Hun 224,
10 N. Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1890), aff'd, 134 N. Y. 596, 31 N. E. 624 (1892); Empiro
State Bag Co. v. McDermott, 89 App. Div. 234, 85 N. Y. Supp. 787 (2d Dep't 1903);
Levy v. Am. Wax & Paper Mfg. Co., 24 Misc. 204, 52 N. Y. Supp. 637 (App, Term
1898); Groetzinger v. Kann, 165 Pa. St. 578, 30 Atl. 1043 (1895).
32. 55 Ohio St. 398, 45 N. E. 634 (1896).
33. Id. at 405, 45 N. E. at 636.
34. 89 App. Div. 234, 85 N. Y. Supp. 787 (2d Dep't 1903).
35. Id. at 236, 85 N. Y. Supp. at 788.
36. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 210 (Rev. ed. 1948).
37. See Camac v. Warriner, 1 C. B. 356, 135 Eng. Rep. 577 (1845); Wait v. Borne,
123 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. 1053 (1890); 1 WILISTON, SALES § 210 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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The second group of cases previously referred to deals more directly with
the retailer-consumer relationship or the individual-with-individual type of
transaction. Here too the courts have decided the cases on their individual
facts but have held generally that the express warranties do not carry over to
subsequent purchases by the consumer.38 The argument against recovery seems
to reduce itself to this-there is no contemplation that a series of future
transactions will result between the parties. If the consumer purchases a
product in reliance on an express warranty and finds the product acceptable
to his taste and needs, he is just as likely to make subsequent purchases at
some other retail outlet. It is the product which satisfies his requirement and
if it can be purchased in most any retail store, there is nothing which would
tend necessarily to induce him to deal e.xclusively with the retailer who made
express warranties as distinguished from any other retailer of the product.
In A. H. Andrews & Son v. Harp& 9 the seller recommended a feed to the
defendant which was a good milk maker and a fine feed. Buyer used the
feed for about a year and then refused to pay for the last shipment, claiming
it was not a good milk maker. He claimed a breach of the express warranty
made on the original sale. The court dismissed his contention "because that
recommendation as to the feed in general was made approximately a year
before the sale and delivery ... of the particular lot of feed which ... caused
the damage for which recovery is here sought. That recommendation was in
no event an express warranty that the original packages sold . . . a year
thereafter would not contain any deleterious or poisonous substance ..
As the seller in the Andrews case was the proprietor of a general store
selling to dairymen in the neighborhood of the small town where he maintained
his business, it is not improbable that the defendant was a steady and regular
customer. This presents the interesting question---should the rule previously
enunciated respecting retailer-consumer have application where the consumer
is a steady customer? The Andrews case would answer in the negative. But
a thorough reading of the court's opinion inclines to the belief that perhaps
the original sale was a test or trial order, though the court does not ground
its holding on that supposition. Hence the case may not be determinative.
On reason, untrammelled by decided cases, it is submitted that the same con-
siderations which favor the carry-over effect of express warranties in the manu-
facturer-retailer relationship should apply to the steady customer situation.4 '
The goods are warranted with the knowledge and impliedly with the ex-
pectation that future orders will be forthcoming in reliance, in some measure,
on the warranties.
38. Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N E. 2d 427 (1941); Smith
v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N. E. 631 (1934); Shull v. Ostrander,
63 Barb. 130 (N. Y. 1863); A. H. Andrews & Son v. Harper, 137 Wash. 353, 242 Pac. 27
(1926). Contra: Englehardt v. Clanton, 83 Ala. 336, 3 So. 6S0 (1888).
39. 137 Wash. 353, 242 Pac. 27 (1926).
40. Id. at 357, 242 Pac. at 28.
41. See note 31 supra.
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